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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
  
 ----------  
  
 No. 94-3324 
  
 ----------  
 
 TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,   
 




H.K. PORTER COMPANY, INC.;  
THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED   
CREDITORS, of H.K. Porter Company, Inc.;  
AIKEN COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;   
ALTOONA AREA SCHOOL; DISTRICT;  
ANDERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;   
BARNWELL SCHOOL DISTRICT #45;  
BEREA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL SYSTEM;   
BLACKWELL PUBLIC SCHOOLS; CENTRAL DAUPHIN SCHOOLS;  
CHARLESTON COUNTY PUBLIC BUILDINGS;  
CHARLESTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS; CHESTER COUNTY   
PUBLIC SCHOOLS; DILLON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;  
DYERSBURG CITY SCHOOLS; FAIRBANKS NORTH STAR BOROUGH;  
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GREENWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT #51;  
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HORRY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;   
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KERSHAW SCHOOL DISTRICT;  
LANCASTER COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;   
LEXINGTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;  
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NATRONA COUNTY SCHOOLS; ORANGEBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT #6;  
ORANGEBURG COUNTY PUBLIC BUILDINGS;  
PEKIN SCHOOL DISTRICT; RICHLAND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT;   
ROWAN COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS; UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA;   
WAKE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;  
WASHINGTON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS;   
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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 H.K. Porter Company, Inc. ("Porter"), a debtor in 
bankruptcy, was, and evidently is presently, insured by Travelers 
Insurance Company ("Travelers").  Certain school district 
creditors (the "Claimants") filed proofs of claims in the Porter 
bankruptcy alleging property damage due to asbestos 
installations.  At some point, believing that the prosecution of 
their claims against Porter would be costly and without 
commensurate benefit, some of the creditors withdrew their 
claims, and others defaulted. 
 Thereafter, on hearing of a possibility that Travelers, 
as Porter's insurer, might be required to respond for damage 
claims against Porter, the school district creditors moved to 
vacate their withdrawals/defaults.  Their motions were granted by 
the bankruptcy court, but with a restriction limiting any 
recoveries to insurance proceeds only. 
 Travelers now asserts that the bankruptcy court's order 
reinstating the claims, but limiting any recovery to insurance 
proceeds: (1) is void for lack of service on Travelers as a 
"party against whom relief is sought"; (2) was the product of 
"collusive prosecution" between Porter and the Claimants; and (3) 
in any event constituted an abuse of discretion because the 
Claimants had not shown "good cause" why their claims should be 
reinstated. 
  
 We neither reach nor address these contentions.  
Rather, we hold that Travelers was not a "person aggrieved" by 
the bankruptcy court's order and hence lacked standing to appeal 
from it, both in this Court and in the district court.  We will 
therefore dismiss Travelers' appeal. 
 
 I 
 The facts relevant to our resolution of this appeal are 
clear and not in dispute.  Thus, our normal review of factual 
findings made by the lower courts and conducted under the clearly 
erroneous standard has little relevance here. 
 Porter, an asbestos manufacturer, filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 11 on February 15, 1991.  The 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "Committee") , 
which included the Claimants' counsel, was appointed on March 8, 
1991.  The bar date for proofs of claim against Porter was set 
for March 16, 1992.  On that day, the Claimants filed 38 
asbestos-related property damage claims (the "claims") against 
Porter totaling $8,364,330.27.1  Porter filed objections to all 
of these claims. 
                     
1
.   At oral argument before us we requested supplemental 
briefing from Travelers and the Claimants on the implications of 
the class action certified in the "School Asbestos" cases, In re 
Asbestos School Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984) and In 
re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, __ U.S. __, 107 S.Ct. 182 (1986).  In their brief, the 
Claimants represented that the following 14 Claimants were 
currently non-opted out members of the class: Aiken County Public 
Schools; Anderson County Public Schools; Barnwell School District 
#45; Blackwell Public Schools; Chester County Public Schools; 
Dillon County Public Schools; Fairbanks North Star Borough; 
Georgetown Public Schools; Greenwood School District #51; Jasper 
  
 A subsequent review by Claimants' counsel of Porter's 
disclosure statements revealed that there were approximately $50 
million in estate assets available to satisfy claims pending 
against the estate.  These claims included a potential $26 to $28 
million priority claim from the Internal Revenue Service and as 
many as 100,000 asbestos-related personal injury claims.  
Porter's schedule of assets was silent as to any insurance 
available to cover the property damage claims asserted by the 
Claimants. 
 In light of the limited assets of the estate, and in 
particular the absence of relevant insurance coverage, the 
Claimants determined that the potential recovery was outweighed 
by the probable cost of pursuing their claims2 and, at the urging 
of the Committee and of Porter, decided not to defend against 
Porter's objections.  Consequently, by two "default orders" dated 
(..continued) 
County Public Schools; Lexington County Public Schools; 
Orangeburg School District #6; and Williamsburg Public Schools.  
In addition, Barnwell School District #45 is a named class 
representative in the School Asbestos litigation. 
 It was also represented that Porter, as a debtor in the 
School Asbestos litigation, had objected, and was still 
objecting, to the claims of the class; that no claims had been 
withdrawn in that proceeding; and that the non-opted out school 
districts had filed the instant action as a protective action. 
 The other claimants in the present action either had 
opted out or did not fall within the definition of the class. 
 Because of our disposition of the present litigation on 
standing grounds, we do not find it necessary to address any of 
the matters raised by the supplemental memoranda as they are not 
at issue before us. 
2
.   The Committee apparently estimated that the available 
dividend payable to unsecured nonpriority creditors would be 
between 3% and 5%.  App. 484. 
  
May 22, 1992, and one "default order" dated May 26, 1992, three 
of the Claimants allowed their claims to be dismissed by default.  
App. 283, 293, 308.  By order dated June 9, 1992 and styled 
"Agreed Order Withdrawing Claims," the remaining 35 Claimants 
withdrew their claims.  App. 334. 
 Sometime following these orders, however, Porter's 
special insurance counsel discovered the existence of several 
insurance policies which he believed could potentially insure up 
to $70-$90 million in property damage claims. 
 Upon learning of this potential insurance coverage, the 
Claimants moved in the bankruptcy court to "Vacate Default 
Judgments and to Reinstate Dismissed or Withdrawn Claims," naming 
Porter and the Committee as Respondents.  App. 482.  
 Because both Porter and the Committee had originally 
prevailed upon the Claimants to withdraw their claims due to the 
absence of insurance, neither saw fit to contest the motion to 
reinstate the claims, even though Porter apparently persists in 
its objections to the claims.3 
 However, Travelers (issuer of one of the newly 
discovered policies with coverage of $1 million), though not a 
party to the proceedings, had been closely monitoring the 
bankruptcy court's docket sheet.  Upon learning of the Claimants' 
                     
3
.   We are informed that Porter has not withdrawn its objections 
to the Claims by the following statement in the Claimants' brief 
at 17: "H.K. Porter has filed objections to [the] claims.  Thus, 
there continues to be the fundamental controversy as to . . . 
whether H.K. Porter has any liability on these claims."   Neither 
Porter nor Travelers has responded to, nor have they addressed, 
this statement. 
  
reinstatement motions, Travelers filed an "Objection of Travelers 
Insurance Company to [Claimants'] 'Motion to Vacate Default 
Judgments and to Reinstate Dismissed or Withdrawn Claims.'"  App. 
604.   
 While denying any liability to Porter or to any of the 
Claimants, Travelers moved in bankruptcy court against 
reinstatement of the claims, arguing substantially the same 
issues raised before the district court and before us. 
 Following a May 20, 1993 hearing attended by 
representatives of Travelers, the Claimants, the Committee and 
Porter, the bankruptcy court rejected Travelers' objections and, 
by order dated June 16, 1993, and opinion dated July 7, 1993, 
vacated its previous orders which approved the withdrawal of some 
of the claims and defaulted others.  The order contained the 
following proviso: 
 [F]or the purposes of payment such claims are 
reinstated only to the extent that they may 
attempt to seek a recovery on account of 
insurance coverage, if any, which is or may 
have been owned or carried by [Porter], and 
no claim may otherwise be made against estate 
assets. 
App. 690. 
 The order made no reference to Travelers (or to any 
other putative insurer), and expressly stated that the bankruptcy 
court "makes no determination as to whether or not the affected 
claims are valid and enforceable claims and this order does not 
in any way speak to the merits of whether or not there is any 
  
insurance coverage applicable or available to pay such claims."  
Id. 
 Travelers appealed the order to the district court 
which, by order of May 17, 1994, affirmed the order of the 
bankruptcy court, holding: (1) that Travelers was not the "party 
against whom relief [was] sought" under Bankruptcy Rule 9014 and 
therefore need not have been served;4 (2) that it was not 
necessary that Porter oppose the reconsideration motion in order 
for there to be a justiciable "case or controversy;" and (3) that 
the discovery of the insurance coverage satisfied Rule 60(b)(2)'s 
"new evidence" ground.5  The district court also rejected 
Travelers' contention that the Claimants, by not sufficiently 
conducting their own discovery, had failed to satisfy the "due 
diligence" requirement of Rule 60.  The district court concluded 
that the Claimants could not be faulted for relying on Porter's 
representations that no insurance existed. 
                     
4
.   Bankruptcy Rule 9014 provides that in certain contested 
matters "relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable 
notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party 
against whom relief is sought. . .."  (Emphasis supplied). 
5
.   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), made applicable to 
bankruptcy proceedings through Bankruptcy Rule 9024, provides in 
part as follows: 
 Relief From Judgment or Order 
                    * * * *  
  (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; 
Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.  On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a 
party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to more for a new trial under Rule 
59(b). . .. 
  
 Travelers has denied throughout that it has any 
liability to Porter or to the Claimants, and, as earlier noted, 
Porter's objections to the claims apparently remain in place.  
 Travelers now appeals to this Court, raising much the 
same issues pressed below.  Because we have concluded that 
Travelers' interest in the order reinstating the claims against 
Porter is too remote and contingent to satisfy the standing 
requirement of bankruptcy appeals, we have no occasion to address 
Travelers' other contentions.6 
 
 II 
 Section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 67(c) (1976) limited appellate standing in bankruptcy cases to 
"person[s] aggrieved by an order of a referee."  Although this 
provision was repealed in 1978, it has been maintained by the 
courts as an essentially prudential requirement that only those 
who have been directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an 
order of a bankruptcy court may bring an appeal.  See In re 
Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).  Notably, the 
standing requirement in bankruptcy appeals is more restrictive 
                     
6
.     We do not reach Travelers' principal argument that 
Travelers (along with the other insurers) was the real "party 
against whom relief was sought" by the Claimants and hence had to 
be served with the motion papers.  However, in light of our 
holding that Travelers is not a "person aggrieved" by the 
bankruptcy court's reinstatement order and hence lacks appellate 
standing, it would clearly be anomalous to hold that Travelers 
might have been considered a "party against whom relief was 
sought" and that the Claimants therefore were required to serve 
Travelers. 
  
than the "case or controversy" standing requirement of Article 
III, which "need not be financial and need only be 'fairly 
traceable' to the alleged illegal action."  Kane v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations 
omitted); cf. In re Chateaugay Corp., 141 B.R. 794, 799 n. 4 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot 988 F.2d 322 (2nd Cir. 1993).   
 "Person aggrieved" is, of course, a term of art: almost 
by definition, all appellants may claim in some way to be 
"aggrieved," else they would not bother to prosecute their 
appeals.  In conventional disputes, the class of potential 
plaintiffs is defined by the constitutional doctrine of standing.  
But in bankruptcy proceedings, which typically involve a "myriad 
of parties . . . indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court 
order," Kane, 843 F.2d at 642, the need to limit collateral 
appeals is particularly acute.  Thus, the "person aggrieved" 
doctrine: 
 [E]xists to fill the need for an explicit 
limitation on standing to appeal in 
bankruptcy proceedings.  This need springs 
from the nature of bankruptcy litigation 
which almost always involves the interests of 
persons who are not formally parties to the 
litigation.  In the course of administration 
of the bankruptcy estate disputes arise in 
which numerous persons are to some degree 
interested.  Efficient judicial 
administration requires that appellate review 
be limited to those persons whose interests 
are directly affected. 
In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 443.  Standing has thus been denied 
to marginal parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings who, even 
though they may be exposed to some potential harm incident to the 
  
bankruptcy court's order, are not "directly affected" by that 
order.  See Kane, 843 F.2d at 642 n. 2; In re Chateaugay, 141 
B.R. at 799 n. 4. 
 We recently affirmed the continuing vitality of the 
"person aggrieved" doctrine in this Circuit.  See In re Dykes, 10 
F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1993).  In Dykes we approved the Ninth 
Circuit's view that one is a "person aggrieved" if the contested 
order "diminishes their property, increases their burdens, or 
impairs their rights."  Id. at 187 (citing In re Fondiller, 707 
F.2d at 442).   
 There can be no contention that Travelers' property has 
been diminished by the bankruptcy court's order of June 16, 1993 
merely because the claims of the school district creditors were 
reinstated.  As we discuss infra, Travelers is at least two steps 
removed from any possible diminution of its property.  
Nevertheless, Travelers argues that the reinstatement of the 
claims against Porter directly increased its pecuniary burdens 
and impaired its rights. 
 Although whether someone is a "person aggrieved" is 
normally a question of fact to be determined by the district 
court, because the facts relevant to our analysis are clear and 
undisputed, we find it unnecessary to remand the case to the 
district court for additional factual findings.  See In re Dykes, 
10 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 1993); In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 
F.2d 151, 154 n. 3  (1st Cir. 1987); In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 
441, 443 (9th Cir. 1993).   Indeed, the factual predicate for our 
  
conclusion is straightforward, and was well summarized by 
Travelers itself in its brief before us: 
 When an insurer issues an indemnity policy to 
an insured, it assumes nothing more than 
derivative liability for any claim covered by 
the policy.  Therefore, an insurer is not 
liable for a claim unless the insured is 
liable first. 
Traveler's Brief at 28.  To this we would add that even upon the 
fixing of the liability of the insured, an insurer has no  
derivative liability unless and until it is determined that the 
policy covers the acts for which the insured has been found 
liable. 
 We are satisfied that Travelers is not a "person 
aggrieved," as its interest is too contingent to have been 
"directly affected" by the order reinstating the claims against 
Porter.  Travelers' potential exposure is doubly removed, turning 
both on the success of the Claimants in their prosecution of 
claims against Porter, and on a judicial determination that the 
policy issued by Travelers covers the claims, a construction 
which Travelers strenuously rejects.  Further, although Porter 
did not contest the vacation of the orders withdrawing and/or 
defaulting the claims, it apparently has not withdrawn its 
objections to the claims themselves.  Even the most generous view 
of these circumstances does not suggest that the order of 
reinstatement directly or immediately impacts on Travelers' 
pecuniary interests.  See In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 443.
 Clearly, to allow appellate standing under such 
  
circumstances would be inconsistent with the "directly affecting" 
standard and the policies which underlie this standard.  Id.  
 Here, however, Travelers has seized on the fact that 
the bankruptcy court's order limited the potential recovery of 
the Claimants to any insurance covering Porter.  In effect, this 
limitation means that any sum eventually recovered by the 
Claimants will ultimately come, if at all, only from Porter's 
insurers, one of which may be Travelers.  Travelers urges that 
"[g]iven that the Bankruptcy Court Order reinstating the Claims 
is conditioned on relief being secured solely from the policies 
issued to Porter by Travelers and the other insurers, it 
certainly increases Travelers burdens and impairs its 
rights. . .." and that "the 'contingency' of Travelers ultimate 
liability on the Claims is irrelevant to the issue of its 
standing."  Travelers' Reply Brief at 7.  We disagree with both 
of these arguments. 
 First, we note that if, as Travelers contends, it has 
no obligations to Porter under the policy, then the order cannot 
affect, and thereby aggrieve, Travelers.  Second, even if the one 
million dollar policy allegedly issued by Travelers does oblige 
it to respond to the property damage claims now asserted, then 
the limiting language of the order still would have no 
detrimental effect on Travelers.  As an insurer covering the 
claims asserted, Travelers would necessarily be required to 
respond to those claims even if the order of court had not 
restricted recovery to insurance proceeds.  We therefore assign 
no weight to the bankruptcy court's provision limiting recovery 
  
to insurance proceeds.  As to Travelers, that language is 
surplusage. 
 Finally, we reject Travelers' contention that the 
contingency of its exposure is irrelevant to the question of 
standing.  We are satisfied that standing is precluded if the 
only interest in the bankruptcy court's order that can be 
demonstrated is an interest as a potential defendant in an 
adversary proceeding.  Such a person, here Travelers, is not 
"aggrieved."  In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 443.  
 Consistent with the view that appeal from bankruptcy 
proceedings is denied to "marginal parties in bankruptcy 
proceedings 'who face potential harm incident to the bankruptcy 
court's order but are not directly affected,'" In re Chateaugay 
Corp., 141 B.R. at 799 (quoting Kane, 843 F.2d at 642 n. 3), 
courts have recognized that an order which simply allows a 
lawsuit to go forward does not necessarily "aggrieve" the 
potential defendant for purposes of appellate standing.7 
                     
7
.   Travelers, in responding to the Claimants' contention that 
it has no standing, refers us to In re Record Club of America, 
Inc., 28 B.R. 996 (M.D. Pa. 1983), which involved an appeal from 
an order confirming the debtor's plan of arrangement. The 
district court in that case accorded standing to several 
corporations involved in litigation with the debtor on the ground 
that the plan of arrangement might affect the rights determined 
by the litigation.  Without commenting on whether litigation as 
such is enough to accord standing as a "person aggrieved," we 
observe first that in this case Travelers is not engaged in 
litigation with any of the claimants.  Second, while we 
acknowledge that Travelers is involved in litigation with Porter 
as to its insurance coverage obligations, that involvement is 
"presumably related to coverage for the reinstated Claims. . .,"  
Travelers' Brief at 13, and thus has no bankruptcy nexus.  That 
litigation, which is wholly separate from Porter's bankruptcy 
  
 In In re Fondiller, one of the first cases to assert 
the common law version of "person aggrieved" after its statutory 
demise in 1978, the Ninth Circuit held that the debtor's wife 
could not appeal an order of the bankruptcy court appointing 
special counsel, even though there was a likelihood that the 
special counsel would bring suit against the wife.  The court 
stated that the wife's "only demonstrable interest in the order 
is as a potential party defendant in an adversary proceeding.  As 
such she is not a 'person aggrieved' [by the order].  The order 
did not diminish her property, increase her burdens, or 
detrimentally affect her rights."  707 F.2d at 443 (citations 
omitted).   
 A similar result was reached in In re El San Juan 
Hotel, which held that an order of the bankruptcy court granting 
the United States leave to sue a former trustee on behalf of the 
estate was not appealable by the former trustee.  The First 
Circuit stated that: 
 As in Fondiller, the bankruptcy court order 
did not diminish [the trustee's] property, 
increase his burdens, or detrimentally affect 
his rights.  The former trustee does have an 
interest in defending himself against 
liability, but the order in question does not 
prevent [him] from doing just that, or from 
asserting any claim or defenses he may have, 
including a motion for summary judgment. 
In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 155 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(citation omitted).  Here, as in In re El San Juan Hotel, while 
(..continued) 
proceedings, cannot suffice to satisfy the "directly affecting" 
standard for standing in bankruptcy appeals.  
  
Travelers has an interest in defending itself against liability, 
it is not prevented by the bankruptcy court order from doing just 
that.  Nor does the order prevent Porter or Travelers from 
asserting any claims or defenses that either may have.  Indeed, 
Travelers has steadfastly maintained that its policy does not 
even cover Porter. 
 As the above-cited authorities recognize, a bankruptcy 
court order which simply permits a claim to be lodged or a 
lawsuit to go forward without passing on the merits does not 
necessarily "aggrieve" the potential defendant.  Here Travelers 
is insisting that the bankruptcy court must vacate its order 
reinstating the claims.  But Travelers, as a contingent insurer, 
rather than seeking to remedy the impairment of its rights or 
lift a pecuniary burden, is seeking a windfall at the expense of 
the Claimants.  This is particularly so because if Travelers 
succeeds in disclaiming coverage vis-a-vis Porter, or if Porter 
succeeds in withstanding the claims asserted against it, no 
liability will ever be visited upon Travelers.  Hence, Travelers 
can be no more "aggrieved" by the order of reinstatement than it 
was "aggrieved" when the Claimants filed their claims against 
Porter in the first instance. 
 
 III 
 In sum, we conclude that Travelers was not a "person 
aggrieved" by the contested order, and thus lacked standing to 
appeal, both in this Court and in the district court.  We will 
therefore dismiss the appeal and remand the proceedings to the 
  
district court with directions to vacate its judgment and to 
enter an order dismissing the appeal from the bankruptcy court. 
 
